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This article surveys the experimental economics approach to the study of religion.
The ﬁeld has a place in the context of the scientiﬁc study of religion generally
and the social psychology of religion in particular, but employs distinct economic
methods which promise new and diﬀerent insights. In particular, certain features of
the experimental approach as used by economists such as incentive compatibility are
particularly appropriate for studying the eﬀect of religion on individual behaviour.
The paper discusses results obtained so far in terms of two roles of religion in shaping
individual behaviour, i.e. as a social group identiﬁer and as a set of values.
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Does religion inﬂuence economic outcomes? This question is obviously rele-
vant to economics as well as appropriate to its methods. Religion matters to
economists for at least two reasons. The ﬁrst is that despite the appearance
of an increasingly secular and scientiﬁc world in the 21st century, it continues
to shape individual values, beliefs and attitudes profoundly. For example, in
2010, more than half of Americans polled by Gallup said that religion is very
important in their lives, a ﬁgure which has not changed signiﬁcantly over the
last forty years. Similarly, the Bertelsmann Stiftung (see Joas, 2008, p. 310)
found in 2008 that 62% of Americans self-classify as highly religious, and only
8% as non-religious. In this, signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist between nations that
suggest explanatory potential for this variable: in the same survey, twice fewer
(28%) and more (18%) Germans than Americans respectively declared to be
highly and non-religious.
The second reason for the economic signiﬁcance of religion lies in its contin-
uing role as an important social group identiﬁer between as well as within
particular societies. Accounts in the ‘clash of cultures’ vein speak of religious
diﬀerences between nations and cultural spheres as a source of international
conﬂict (e.g. Huntington, 1998). Within particular nations, for example in
Western Europe, the success of multiculturalism is increasingly questioned in
public discourse partly due to persistent religious diﬀerences between native
and immigrant communities which are (rightly or wrongly) argued to under-
mine social cohesion with concomitant economic eﬀects.
Together, these two facets of religion, i.e. religious values and religious groups
constitute important variables for economic analysis as they plausibly inﬂu-
ence behaviour in secular settings and thereby aﬀect economic outcomes. Re-
ligious values and doctrine are social institutions with a normative character.
They guide adherents’ social behaviour with clear ramiﬁcations for economic
exchange. Religious groups, in contrast, inﬂuence these interactions based on
the other’s ingroup or outgroup status and can generate well-known group
eﬀects such as ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination. Again, the
resulting economic implications of groups are clear and have been extensively
studied by economists in other contexts as economic networks (e.g. Jackson,
2008).
These issues motivate an economics research agenda as to whether and how
religious values and groups aﬀect economic decision making and outcomes (see
ﬁgure 2). At the aggregate level, broadly following Max Weber’s thesis of the
Protestant work ethic, one can observe striking diﬀerences in per-capita GDP
between nations or regions grouped by their predominant religions (e.g Argyle,
2000, p. 151). In 2009, Christian nations had a higher mean annual GDP per
capita (16500 U.S.$) than Islamic ones (8500) and those with other religions
2(11000).1 A 2010 Gallup poll found that countries with more religious popu-
lations tend to be poorer (Crabtree, 2010). However, these kind of blunt facts
are misleading and may reﬂect other geo-political or historical commonalities
between the countries concerned rather than the eﬀects of religiosity or sub-
stance of particular religious dogmata. For example, perhaps parts of the world
with poorer resource endowments are more open to proselytisation. Or Chris-
tian religion outside Europe is really a proxy for an inheritance of eﬃcacious
economic institutions (e.g. Hall and Jones, 1999). As a result, sophisticated
studies have been conducted by macroeconomists that gauge religious eﬀects
on economic outcomes using appropriate controls for other factors. For exam-
ple, in terms of religious values, Barro and McCleary (2003) ﬁnd that, across
countries, average religious service attendance is negatively associated with
GDP growth. As for evidence concerning the macro eﬀects of religious groups,
Guiso et al. (2009) ﬁnd that bilateral trade between countries is promoted by
their cultural similarity which includes religion.
These and many other empirical studies have reliably demonstrated a host of
signiﬁcant relationships between religion and economic outcomes at the coun-
try or other aggregate levels. However, these are hard to interpret without
understanding their underlying causes, which cannot be gleaned from macro
data. Three issues are involved: ﬁrst, religious variables can have both positive
and negative impacts on economic outcomes. For example, while McCleary and
Barro (2006) show in cross-country panel data that church attendance reduces
GDP growth, beliefs in an afterlife raise it for reasons which are not clear.
The second is causality. Religious and economic variables inﬂuence each other
in directions that are not easy to ascertain yet are crucial to policy makers
(Scobie, 1975, p. 33). While many studies report signiﬁcant least-squares re-
lationships on the interpretation that the religious variables cause economic
outcomes, McCleary and Barro (2006) show the opposite: in their instrumental
variable model higher GDP per capita causes a reduction in average religios-
ity. A third issue relates to spurious correlations, where both the religious
and economic variables are inﬂuenced by another underlying force. For exam-
ple, as seen above, when certain state religions are internationally associated
with lower economic performance, both may be results of particular historical,
geo-political or geographical trajectories rather than direct inﬂuences on each
other.
The existence but complex nature of these observed relationships between reli-
gious and macroeconomic variables motivate research to examine their micro-
foundations in individual behaviour. The hope is that a better understanding
of the eﬀect an individual’s religious values and group membership have on
his or her behaviour can shed light on the causal forces behind aggregate
empirical phenomena and address the three diﬃculties noted above. There
are two reasons for optimism here. First, opposing eﬀects of religion on eco-
nomic outcomes have also been identiﬁed in individual behaviour in psycho-
3logical studies. On one hand, religions tend to espouse pro-social values such
as charity, forgiveness, honesty and tolerance, especially towards fellow ad-
herents. On the other, particular religious teachings such as human sinfulness
or Protestant predestination may have the opposite eﬀect (Schoenfeld, 1978).
More importantly, through its social group role, membership of a particular
religious group may instil prejudice towards religious outgroup members. Mi-
croeconomic approaches may provide ways to isolate these diﬀerent inﬂuences.
Second, microeconomic investigations may allow us to unmask the direction
of causal eﬀects behind particular macroeconomic correlations, such as in the
link between religion and economic outcomes (Shariﬀ and Norenzayan, 2007,
p. 4), co-variates of religion such as ethnicity and resource endowments and
so forth. Looking at individuals permits eﬀective controls for confounding fac-
tors. As an example, to better isolate the eﬀect of religious creed on economic
performance from country-level confounds, we may compare family incomes
within multi-religious nations. This kind of work has established that within
particular nations, household incomes diﬀer by the religious creed (e.g. Homola
et al., 1987) as well as religiosity (e.g. Freeman, 1986) of its members.
One of the ﬁrst such micro-approaches may be termed the rational choice
theory of religion. It examines religion through the lens of microeconomic
theory, i.e. through the modelling of religious individuals, organisations and
competition between them in order to explain known empirical facts. Here,
religious adherents are rational consumers of religious commodities which pro-
vide utility in this life and the next. They are provided by religious organi-
sations that act as joint-production or competing market organisations (see
Iannaccone (1998) for a survey of this area). However, despite the promise of
this approach, it has a potentially paradoxical quality that presents certain
methodological drawbacks. Iannaccone (1998) concedes that it cannot deal
well with what makes religious beliefs and resulting actions distinct from other
forms of rational choice. Roughly speaking, it is diﬃcult to see how agents or
economists modelling them can or would assign utilities and probabilities to
afterlife events.2
We have seen that aggregate-level empirical approaches conﬁrm relationships
between religion and economic outcomes but leave open questions about their
nature. Conversely, the rational choice approach shows how diﬀerent types of
religious motivations and beliefs generate particular phenomena in theory, but
say little about actual religious beliefs or behaviour. Another approach to the
study of religion within microeconomics seeks to combine the advantages of
empirical insight about actual religious practice with the control that mod-
elling aﬀords. This type of programme is in general referred to as behavioural
economics (e.g. Camerer, 2003a, p. 1-4) and uses experiments as the core
method. In experiments, abstracted decision tasks are systematically manip-
ulated to observe the eﬀect of variables of interest on subject behaviour while
controlling confounding inﬂuences. In this sense, the experimental approach
4more generally marries the advantages of economic theory and psychology.
There are three methodological reasons in favour of such an approach to the
study of religion which will be explored in more detail later: ﬁrst, experimental
controls promise the disentangling of confounding variables and cause-or-eﬀect
issues. Second, experimental tasks provide standardised ways of measuring key
behaviours that facilitate benchmarking and replication. Third, experimental
incentives may alleviate response biases.
The purpose of this article is to survey, for the ﬁrst time, a growing ﬁeld of the
experimental economics of religion. In addition to organising and evaluating
existing studies, I will assess to what extent the ﬁeld has made good on the
promise to make a contribution to the study of religion from economic science.
I will begin by outlining its methodological antecedents in the scientiﬁc and,
in particular, psychological study of religion (section 2). The article then dis-
cusses the unique methods the experimental economics approach commonly
uses and the results so far obtained in its application to religion (section 3).
The ﬁnal section provides an overall assessment and outlook to future work.
2 The social scientiﬁc study of religion
The experimental economics of religion has roots in prior scientiﬁc approaches
to religion and especially those from psychology (see ﬁgure 2 for a family tree of
the diﬀerent approaches). While the liberal arts (i.e. historical, philosophical,
theological and aesthetic approaches) tend to study the content of religious
doctrines and practices normatively, the scientiﬁc study of religion is inter-
ested in gauging its causes and impacts in various aspects of social life. It
arguably began in earnest with the separation of the individual social sciences
from philosophy over the last 150 or so years. Accordingly, each brought its
own objectives and methods to the table (for the historical context, see Spinks,
1963; Scobie, 1975). While, as we have seen, economists are relative newcom-
ers to the issue of religion, it has generated well-developed sub-ﬁelds within
all the other social sciences. Anthropologists study diﬀerent stages in the de-
velopment of religion; sociologists examine the role of religious institutions in
sustaining order in society. The contribution of psychology to the scientiﬁc
study of religion is distinct from these approaches in that the focus is on the
individual and its thought processes (Spilka et al., 2003). It was motivated
by previous comparative studies in anthropology which uncovered similarities
between religions in otherwise diﬀerent societies that could not be explained
entirely by cultural mechanisms (Spinks, 1963, p. 3, 11, 35). A potential expla-
nation is that religion developed in response to universal human psychological
features such as the need for explanation and for social order (Spilka et al.,
2003, p. 46-47). Religion may be the result of cultural evolution in response
to mental adaptations (e.g. Boyer, 2001). It fulﬁls these human needs through
religious groups and doctrines.
5Fig. 1. Diﬀerent diciplines within the study of religion.
A number of diﬀerent strands in the psychological approach to religion can be
identiﬁed. The ﬁrst, perhaps the psychoanalysis (or psychopathology) of reli-
gious individuals, lies outside social science and attempts to explain religious
behaviour (such as sudden conversion and mystical experiences) through in-
dividual thought processes. A second strand, akin to a comparative religious
psychology, deals with diﬀerences in socio-economic and political attitudes,
personality and demographic characteristics between the members of diﬀer-
ent religious denominations. Such work has links to the sociology of religion
and reveals the social trends in particular societies. These types of concern
are peripheral to economists’ interest and will remain incidental to the sur-
vey of ﬁndings of this paper. A third, recent strand is neuro-theology which
examines the roots of religious experience in inherited traits and neurological
processes. Finally, the fourth strand is the social psychology of religion (Ar-
gyle and Beit-Hallahmi 1975, p. 1-2; Argyle 2000, p. 11; Spilka et al. 2003,
p. 2). It assesses the causes and eﬀects of individual religion on behaviour in
religious as well as secular spheres. It provides a launch point for the experi-
mental approach to religion from economic science. A brief outline of this ﬁeld
is therefore worthwhile to provide the scientiﬁc context. The three parts of
this ﬁeld, individual religion, its causes and eﬀects provide the structure to
this overview. The various dependent and independent variables examined in
the process are displayed in schematic form in ﬁgure 2 which will be explained
further as part of the summary in the concluding section 4.
2.1 Deﬁnition and measurement of individual religion
The scientiﬁc study of religion and the psychological approach to assessing
its causes and eﬀects rests on the identiﬁcation and measurement of pertinent
variables, and none more so than individual religion itself. The deﬁnition of
religion has been as controversial as that of the related and similarly elusive,
intangible concept of culture. For Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975, p. 1), re-
ligion is “a system of beliefs in a divine or superhuman power, and practices
6of worship or other rituals directed towards such a power”. Other commenta-
tors add dimensions of religious emotions and experience, as well as eﬀects of
religious belonging on behaviour in secular contexts (Spinks, 1963, p. 8).
In terms of measurement, there are two aspects to religion at the individual
level: ‘horizontal’ religion , i.e. denomination or creed, if any (atheism or ag-
nosticism), and ‘vertical’ religion, the extent of adherence to it in the former
case, i.e. religiosity. Even the ﬁrst of these dimensions is not as straightfor-
ward as one might think with a proliferation of faiths and schisms within
them that often have fuzzy boundaries. In most studies, this kind of informa-
tion is elicited by asking whether or not respondents belong to a religion, and
presenting those who do with a pre-set list of alternatives (C2 in ﬁgure 2).
Compared with religious aﬃliation, the deﬁnition and measurement of religios-
ity involves deeper, conceptual issues. In psychological terms, religion can be
deﬁned and measured as a set of attitudes and accompanying behaviours, or
both. As a result, many measures have been used (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi,
1975, p. 2): a behaviourist approach is to measure outward signs of religiosity
such as self-reports of religious service attendance, religious occupations (e.g.
someone’s clergy or seminary student status) or religious donations (C2; D4).
While these types of measure are useful in that they generate interval scale
(or at least ordinal) data on religiosity relatively easily through surveys, there
may be reliability issues when respondents have lacking incentive or ability to
accurately state true values. Further, diﬀerent institutional practices makes
comparisons across religions for variables like service attendance problematic.
Also, outward signs of religiosity may capture convention following and not
private religious devotional activities or spirituality which researchers need
to tell apart. In response, alternative behavioural indicators have been used
including private prayer activity and particular religious experiences. In addi-
tion, researchers can measure general attitudes towards religion and speciﬁc
beliefs (such as the divine and an afterlife, B4). The motivation behind in-
dividual religion can also be gauged. For example, Allport and Ross (1967)
created a religious orientation scale that measures individual religiosity as
extrinsic (participation for instrumental reasons such as social or material
beneﬁt) or intrinsic (acceptance of and engagement with the doctrinal con-
tent) religiosity (B3). Batson et al. (1993, p. 166) later added quest as a third
orientation that captures honest search and existential questioning without
dogmatic attachment to particular precepts.
As a logical consequence of this variety of individually valid but incomplete as-
pects of religiosity, a multi-dimensional approach has been pioneered by Glock
and Stark (1965). This work theoretically and empirically identiﬁes ﬁve sepa-
rate aspects of individual religiosity (C3). Religious knowledge (or theological
religiosity) encompasses the extent of intellectual familiarity with dogma. Re-
ligious belief involves the degree of personal commitment and faith in a par-
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cludes organised worship, prayer, study of scriptures, proselytising activity and
adherence to the moral/ethical precepts of the religion concerned. Religious
and personal mystical experience (experiential religiosity) include conversion
events, glossolalia and healing events. Finally, religious eﬀects (consequential
religion) involve the connection between belief and behaviour, i.e. the rewards
and responsibilities that accompany religiousness, such as peace of mind, com-
posure, adoption of morals and principles of behaviour. Most scholars accept
the multi-dimensionality of religiosity (DeJong et al., 1976). As a result, there
is now a large number of tested, reliable instruments measuring one or more of
the facets of individual religion discussed above. A volume edited by Hill and
Hood (1999) contains over 120 of these measuring the dimensions discussed
here as well as additional ones.
2.2 Antecedents of individual religion
While the deﬁnition and measurement of religion is crucial for social scien-
tists, its antecedents are less obviously important. Why may we want to know
the reasons some people are more and others less religious according to the
dimensions described in the previous section? When religious belief has poten-
tial for harmful consequences, as in the case of cult activities, understanding
what kind of person is typically religious informs policy. The ebb and ﬂow
of religious sentiment over time can also be better understood in the context
of more general demographical or socio-economic changes in society. The ori-
gins of religiosity in age, gender, social class etc. permit such insight. Finally,
the antecedents of individual religion can help disentangle spurious correlates
from causal factors found in empirical religious research. For instance, a rela-
tionship between religiosity and behaviour may capture the causal inﬂuences
of individual-level variables (such as gender) underlying a person’s religiosity
rather than its independent eﬀect. This informs empirical researchers which
kinds of variables require control in their studies.
On the other hand, the study of antecedents of religiosity harbours its own
methodological issues which serve as a caution for the results summarised
in outline below: relationships are not always linear or clear-cut, may aﬀect
diﬀerent religiosity dimensions or religious creeds diﬀerently and involve psy-
chological or demographic constructs that are not obvious to interpret. In
addition, these relationships themselves require control for other correlated
variables that may confound them. Cause and eﬀect between antecedents and
religiosity are likewise not simple to tease apart: religious membership is ca-
pable of reinforcing or changing independently-held traits.
That being said, a number of antecedents of individual religiosity have been
reliably shown in empirical research (see Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975;
Argyle, 2000, for comprehensive, but now dated overviews). First, physical
8demographics such as age and gender have been studied (A1). Religiosity
typically exhibits a cycle over a person’s lifetime. While childhood religion
follows parental guidance, adolescent questioning lowers religiosity into adult-
hood when it remains stable. Older people’s religion becomes more complex
with stronger beliefs but lesser activity and fundamentalism. In terms of gen-
der, females are signiﬁcantly more religious in most measures. Among poten-
tial explanations, there are potentially biological ones (lesser aggression and
greater fearfulness), environmental factors such as upbringing (A3)a n do c c u -
pation (B1), as well as certain personality traits more associated with women
such as suggestibility and guilt (A2).
These kinds of ﬁnding point to antecedents of religiosity in individual dif-
ferences between people.3 Personality traits, learning styles, values and atti-
tudes have been examined comprehensively, but one should note the fuzzy
conceptual boundaries between them. Evidence suggests only weak links of
the major personality factors to religiosity. However, at more speciﬁc lev-
els of personality, there is evidence that more religious people generally tend
more towards agreement with others, and especially to those in authority. In
particular, traits found to be related to religiosity include psychoticism, con-
formity, suggestibility, submissiveness, guilt feelings, lower self-esteem as well
as dogmatism and authoritarianism (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Argyle,
2000, A2). In terms of learning and problem solving, there is some evidence
for negative relationships between religiosity and creativity (Bender, 1968),
IQ (Nyborg, 2009) as well as educational (Albrecht and Heaton, 1984) and,
in the case of academics, scientiﬁc achievement (Larson and Witham, 1998).
Positive relationships have been shown with intuitive, ‘feeling’ thinking styles.
The meta study by Saroglou et al. (2004) surveyed studies relating religiosity
to Schwartz’s universal human values system and found that it is positively
associated with a range of values expressing conservatism and negatively with
individualistic ones. Attitudes, which operate at a more speciﬁc level than
values, have also been examined. Religious people tend to be politically more
conservative and right-wing, ethnocentric and prejudiced (B2).
2.3 Consequences of individual religion
In contrast to more invariant personality traits, explanations of religiosity in
terms of attitudes and to a lesser extent values beg the question of causation.
Religious activities can shape attitudes and, through them, generate conse-
quences in secular life. Psychologists in particular and social scientists more
generally have studied a variety of such individual consequences of religiosity,
including subjective well-being, physical and mental health outcomes, rela-
tionship and sexual behaviour, crime and delinquency as well as occupational
choices (for overviews, see Iannaccone, 1998; Spilka et al., 2003). In addition to
lifestyle and long-term behaviour (B1, C1), one may look at behavioural ten-
dencies and speciﬁc types of social interaction. This latter area is particularly
9interesting to economists as it relates religion to generic individual decision
making that inﬂuences economic outcomes and may provide insights on the
eﬀects of religion observed in the empirical work discussed earlier. This area
holds promise also because of the moral and ethical prescriptions religious
doctrines consist of. Four main dimension of social behaviour have received
most attention, which we may categorise as trust, co-operation, altruism and
opportunistic behaviour (D3).
Trust As a lubricant of social and economic interactions, trust is important to
organisation generally and has been studied by social scientists in many con-
texts. As we will see later, it is an increasingly important variable in economic
research. We may suspect a link to individual religiosity because religion en-
courages an individual’s trust in religious authority, ﬁgures and deities. On the
other hand however, some doctrines depict people as sinful by nature (Schoen-
feld, 1978). Others, such as certain types of Calvinism, portray life as zero-sum
where divine favour is revealed in individual material success compared to oth-
ers (McCleary and Barro, 2006). There is evidence from two studies that trust
is related to church attendance irrespective of denomination. However, qualiﬁ-
cations apply in both. In Schoenfeld’s (1978) attitude survey of over 1500 U.S.
respondents he additionally ﬁnds hints of a curvilinear relationship between
trust and religiosity: in particular, there was greater mistrust among high-
attendance individuals and members of more fundamentalist churches. In a
similarly-sized sample of U.S. high school students studied by Bahr and Mar-
tin (1983), faith in people was related to a three-way classiﬁcation of church
attendance, but less strongly than with non-religious variables such as school
grades and parental socio-economic status.
Forgiveness Forgiving others may seem like a purely religious notion, but its
role in sustaining the evolution of cooperation is important in economic the-
ory (Axelrod, 1984, p. 36). Although it is a key religious concept, especially in
Christianity, it eludes easy deﬁnition and measurement. It is often advocated
selectively based on the transgressor’s (diﬀerent or same) religious aﬃliation,
remorse or restitution or other contextual factors. McCullough and Worthing-
ton (1999) survey the empirical psychological research on religion and for-
giveness. They conclude that there is some evidence of a correlation between
religiosity and positive attitudes towards forgiving. These appear, however, to
be stronger in the genuinely devout rather than religious conformists. Signiﬁ-
cantly, there are no or at best low correlations between religiosity and forgive-
ness when respondents are asked to recall speciﬁc past situations. The reason
for this discrepancy between forgiveness attitudes and forgiving behaviour
might be the high social desirability of the concept for religious people.
Opportunism This euphemistic term is commonly used by economists to de-
scribe “self-interest that contemplates guile” (Williamson, 1993, p. 92). Psy-
chologists of religion have studied it as dishonesty, deviance and cheating
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attitudes towards tax compliance, petty theft and littering. In general, de-
mographic variables provided more powerful relationships than religious ones.
However, tax evasion was negatively correlated with church attendance and
fundamentalism. For theft, religious variables had no impact. Church atten-
dance but not fundamentalism was negatively associated with littering. Per-
rin (2000) tested the relationship between religiosity and cheating behaviour
among 150 undergraduate students. In the experiment, subjects were asked
to check their grades in an ostensibly wrongly-graded class test. Only 32%
reported back honestly, 52% falsely claimed their tests were correctly graded,
and 16% claimed they were owed a point. Four out of seven measures of
religiosity were signiﬁcant and positively related to honesty. However, by in-
spection, the marginal eﬀects in this study seem low or non-existent for the
highest religiosity categories.
Altruism The fourth dimension involves altruism, which, as we will see later, is
also an increasingly important notion in economics (e.g. Rabin, 1993). In the
social psychology of religion, it has been measured in contexts such as charity,
general volunteering and speciﬁc helping behaviour. A number of studies elicit
self-reports of helping which were, on the whole, only weakly correlated with
various measures of individual religion (for an overview see Batson et al., 1993).
However, because religious people may over-report pro-social behaviour which
conform to religious norms and contribute towards positive self-image, other
studies have attempted to measure helping in actual behaviour. An example is
an experimental design where subjects encounter people apparently in distress
staged to assess the eﬀect of religious variables on assistance rendered. Darley
and Batson (1973), for instance, asked theology student subjects to prepare
and then record a speech on either a neutral topic or on the Good Samaritan
parable. Although the religious prime was associated with more assistance
when subjects encountered the distress situations, the authors found these to
be statistically insigniﬁcant. The authors comment that “it is hard to think of
ac o n t e x ti nw h i c hn o r m sc o n c e r n i n gh e l p i n gt h o s ei nd i s t r e s sa r em o r es a l i e n t
than for a person thinking about the Good Samaritan, and yet it did not
signiﬁcantly increase helping behaviour” (Darley and Batson, 1973, p. 107).
This conclusion has been criticised as unwarranted due to the small sample
size and statistical methods used (Greenwald, 1975). However, in two studies
by Annis (1975; 1976) the same result was obtained in that religious attitudes
and activities do not explain helping behaviour.
Hunsberger and Platonow (1987) argue that the unexpected, face-to-face na-
ture of the helping situations above elicit situational rather than persistent
inﬂuences on behaviour and therefore limit the generality of the ﬁndings re-
ported. In their own two experiments, subject groups of students who com-
pleted a questionnaire were approached three weeks later with an apparent
request for volunteers by local charitable organisations. In both experiments,
11religiosity measured as Christian orthodoxy did not diﬀerentiate those sub-
jects who agreed to volunteer from the rest. In the second experiment, the
authors added a scale of extrinsic versus intrinsic religious orientation to the
questionnaire, the former of which which correlated negatively, and the latter
weakly positively with intention to volunteer. Overall, there seems to be lit-
tle evidence for an association between religiosity and altruism. Batson et al.
(1993, p. 338-342) survey a dozen or so studies in the area of helping and
conclude that when helping is measured in self-reports, weak positive asso-
ciations with religiosity exist, but these largely disappear when behavioural
rather than attitudinal measures are used.
2.4 Conclusion
The social scientiﬁc approach to the study of religion surveyed in this section
seeks to identify how individual religion is caused by and in turn aﬀects social
behaviour in secular settings. In this agenda, the antecedents of religion are
interesting mainly to the extent that reliable consequences of it can be found.
We would expect such relationships due to the clear hypothetical link between
religion and greater pro-social behaviour. But, as Batson et al. (1993) ask, do
religious people practice what they preach? While a number of studies have
shown that religious people are more pro-social in religious contexts, i.e. to-
wards fellow church members and in terms of church donations (Argyle, 2000,
p. 184-185), these results do not translate into the secular realm economists
are interested in. In the words of Spilka et al. (2003, p. 171), there is “a clas-
sic problem-namely, the discrepancy between the word and its realization in
practice.” The situation was summarised in a confessional by a leading scholar
in this area:
Particularly disappointing were my eﬀorts to ﬁnd any empirical support
for the proposition that religion sustains conformity to the normative order
... Even with large samples and hundreds of survey items to work with I
was unable to ﬁnd any clear patterns of religious eﬀects. None of the many
measures of religious commitment seemed to matter on a whole range of
attitudes and social activities. (Stark, 1984, p. 273, 281)
The situation is exacerbated when scholars move beyond self-reports of pro-
sociality that give benign religious consequences the best chance of manifesting
themselves. As we have seen, this is true especially when studies are trying
to correct for desirability bias which presents a signiﬁcant methodological
problem generally: “the distinction between personal involvement and social
conformity needs to be explored with regard to the actual practice [...], not
its social desirability, conformity, and self-serving verbal possibilities” (Spilka
et al., 2003, p. 172). In Perrin’s (2000) words:
Most of the studies are plagued by measurement problems, especially in the
dependent variable [which is] typically measured as self-reported attitudes
12and behaviours. Since prosocial behaviour such as honesty, kindness, and
compassion are very socially desirable, especially among young Christians,
it seems especially diﬃcult to interpret high self-ratings. Complicating mat-
ters further, much of the research suggests that the religiosity eﬀects are
strongest when people self-report prosocial behavior, or feel others might
be watching. (Perrin, 2000, p. 537)
Despite the recognition of desirability and similar types of bias, researchers
within the psychology of religion have not made much progress in overcom-
ing it. Spilka et al. (2003, p. 419) note, in the context of measuring cheating
behaviour, there are practical diﬃculties in putting people in “realistic cir-
cumstances” for ethical and practical reasons.
3 The experimental economic study of religion
The issue of self-report biases in questionnaires and diﬃculties with confounds
in some of the richer experimental studies provide important motivations for
the application of experimental economics to the scientiﬁc study of religion.
First, then, in contexts such as religion, survey responses may be unreliable due
to conformity, self-image or desirability biases (Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2001; Chandon et al., 2005). In response, economic experiments usually involve
incentive-compatible choices, i.e. ones where subjects are incentivised to reveal
true behaviours by associating their particular decisions with corresponding
material outcomes. Second, controlled and abstracted laboratory tasks oﬀer an
alternative approach to studies of individual behaviour in natural or otherwise
uncontrolled settings which can be subject to various uncontrolled inﬂuences.
As an example, the distress design used in the experimental helping litera-
ture presents a potentially confounded task environment to the extent that
subjects harbour conﬂicts between desires to help the apparent victim and
compliance with the experimental instructions, ability to deal with with sud-
den and face-to-face interactions and the like. Similarly, survey-based studies
at the microeconomic level can suﬀer from the problem of confounds to which
controlled experiments provide an potential answer. A diﬀerence in behaviour
seemingly attributable to religion may easily be caused by other associated
diﬀerences, such as class. As Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975, p. 94) note: “it
is important to distinguish between the eﬀects of religion and of associated
cultural variables.” Freeman, who found an association between church atten-
dance and economic potential in the survey responses of African-American
youths, comments:
We must now ask to what extent, if at all, the estimated eﬀects of the back-
ground variables reﬂect true causal inﬂuences ... To answer this question re-
quires a genuine experiment in which one changes the relevant background
variables and observes the ensuing behavior. For instance, one could pro-
vide money to black churches to expand their membership and see whether
the youths attracted to the churches altered their behavior. In the absence
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about causality. (Freeman, 1986, p. 371)
Despite Iannaccone’s (1998, p. 1475) pessimistic response to this suggestion,
one would have thought such type of experiment is clearly possible (if logis-
tically and ﬁnancially challenging).4 Third, experimental economics is useful
in the study of religion as it has developed a set of standard game tasks that
measure a range of pro-social behaviours (Camerer and Fehr, 2004) which are
particularly suited for the study of the behavioural consequences of individ-
ual religion. They allow us to study the eﬀects of religious creed or religiosity
on diﬀerent aspects of pro-sociality such as fairness, altruism and reciprocity.
These games have been used widely with diﬀerent samples and conditions that
allow the benchmarking of new data collected in the context of religion. Each
of the games is said to measure particular aspects of pro-social behaviour,
i.e. behaviour that reveals subjects’ utility not only from their own payoﬀs,
but from those others receive both in absolute terms (altruism, spite) and
compared to own payoﬀs( f a i r n e s s ,e n v y ) .Ar a p i d l yg r o w i n gl i t e r a t u r ei ne x -
perimental economics has established impressive lists of factors that determine
subject behaviour in these games including diﬀerent sorts of social preferences
that are relevant to religion scholarship.
So what are economic experiments? Subject behaviour is typically observed
under conditions of incentive compatibility and absence of deception of sub-
jects in tasks that can be systematically manipulated to examine the eﬀect
of decision variables of interest while controlling confounding inﬂuences.5 The
eﬀects of these decision variables on behaviour in diﬀerent tasks constitute
the body of ﬁndings the experimental economics ﬁeld generates. If one con-
ceives of experimental behaviour as the result of decisions made on the basis of
decision makers’ own characteristics, their expectations of others’ behaviour
and the features of the task, then three groups of factors that inﬂuence ob-
served behaviour emerge:6 The ﬁrst group of environmental factors relate to
the structural, ﬁxed characteristics of the experimental task that subjects
respond to, including decision alternatives, task repetition and framing, the
absolute and relative size of payoﬀsf o rd i ﬀerent outcomes as well as number
of other decision makers. A second set of social factors involves the inﬂuences
these other participants have on subject behaviour and encompasses a number
of pervasive and robust social phenomena such as inﬂuence, facilitation and
intergroup eﬀects that are fundamental to social behaviour. Thirdly, internal
variables reﬂect the nature of subjects themselves such as their demographics
(age, gender, academic major, ethnic origin), level of experience, attitudes or
even hormonal balances that moderate their decision making. The latter two
groups of social and internal factors provide the context for the study of reli-
gion, as religious groups and values, within experimental economics. We now
survey the ﬁndings these two have generated in four classes of relevant exper-
imental task, cooperation, trust, altruism (D1) and parametric choice (D2).7
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psychologists of religion reported above. For the purposes of the survey, I clas-
sify (and therefore review) studies as belonging to experimental economics of
religion to the extent that they entail controlled manipulations that test the
eﬀect of religious variables on subject behaviour under conditions of incentive
compatibility. The individual studies surveyed are summarised in tables 1-3.
3.1 Cooperation
We have seen that religion has obvious links to cooperation, an individual’s
contribution to a public good despite self-regarding incentives to the contrary.
The possibility of cooperation in the absence of external enforcement is one
of the central themes of economic science (e.g. Sugden, 1986). To study how
informal religious activities and values support individual cooperation and
contribute to ‘spontaneous’ order, i.e. order without external enforcement is
an important question in this broader agenda.
3.1.1 Common-pool resource dilemma
In one of the ﬁrst projects in the experimental economics of religion, Sosis
and Ruﬄee x a m i n e dc o o p e r a t i o nu s i n gan e wg a m ei nw h i c ht w op l a y e r se a c h
make simultaneous withdrawals (i.e. under imperfect information) from an
envelope containing 100 coins. If the sum of withdrawals exceeds 100, neither
wins anything. Otherwise, players receive their withdrawals plus half of the
sum remaining in the envelope multiplied by 1.5. The best reply to any with-
drawal by the other player is to withdraw the remainder, which is unknown.
Any two withdrawals summing to 100 are a Nash equilibrium (as are mutual
withdrawals of 100 each). All Nash equilibria are Pareto-dominated except
the two where one player withdraws 100 and the other nothing. Further, col-
lective eﬃciency (the sum of both players’ payoﬀs) falls with both players’
withdrawals. Lower withdrawals therefore mean greater cooperation.
Ruﬄea n dS o s i su s e dt h i sg a m ei nt w os t u d i e sw i t hI s r a e l is u b j e c t s .I nt h eﬁ r s t
(Sosis and Ruﬄe, 2003; Ruﬄea n dS o s i s ,2 0 0 7 ) ,t h e yc o m p a r ea v e r a g ew i t h -
drawals between subject pairs where both are from either a religious or a sec-
ular kibbutz. Overall, religious individuals withdraw more (31.8 shekels) than
secular ones (30.3). Further broken down by gender, the respective average
withdrawals for secular males (30.1) and females (30.5), religious males (29.9)
and females (33.7) look rather similar. There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
religious, but not between secular males and females respectively (Ruﬄea n d
Sosis, 2007). However, when comparing religious with non-religious kibbutz
subjects, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences for males or for females respec-
tively.8 Overall and for females, then, religious individuals are less cooperative,
albeit not signiﬁcantly. In addition, the gender eﬀect seems larger than that
of religious membership.
15When other variables are controlled for in Tobit regression analysis, the au-
thors do however obtain signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for dummy variables for three
of the four gender-religion subgroups.9 They conclude from this that religious
males withdrew less than religious females and secular males. This eﬀect is
found to be driven by those religious males who attend synagogue daily and is
attributed to their institutional role in Jewish religious practices. The picture
that emerges from this work is that values from religious socialisation in the
kibbutz had little impact on cooperative behaviour.
Karlan (2005) includes church attendance variables in an experiment with
41 groups consisting of 9 to 29 female joint micro-ﬁnance loan recipients in
rural Peru. Each received a coin to keep or pass back to the experimenter; if
80% or more were received from the group, every subject in it was given two
coins. Whether a subject attends church was not a signiﬁcant factor. However,
subjects who attended church recently were more likely to contribute (only at
the 90%-level of signiﬁcance). The R2-value of the model concerned was only
about 6%.
3.1.2 Public good game
A popular experimental tool to examine cooperation is the public good game
which has been used extensively over the last half century or so to populate
an impressive list of factors which promote cooperative behaviour in it (for an
overview see Ledyard, 1995). A number of studies have used it to examine the
link between religion and cooperation. In it, a group of n players individually
decide to divide a stake of tokens in either a group or private fund. Total
earnings are their private allocation plus a times the total of all group allo-
cations. This is repeated r times. This game is a multi-person version of the
prisoners dilemma. Instrumentally rational play involves allocating the entire
endowment to the private fund, an outcome that is ineﬃcient compared to
full investment in the public fund. In typical experiments, depending on their
demographics, structural conditions of play and values, subjects contribute
positive amounts to the public fund that decline over repetitions of the game.
Anderson and Mellor (2009) conducted a PGG experiment with U.S. subjects
in the age group 50+ years and n=8, a=2 and r=10. They found that aver-
age contributions over rounds by subjects of Protestant (52% of the stake),
Catholic (40), other (30) and no religious aﬃliation (51) were not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent. Similarly, there were no clear patterns in contributions between those
who, in the last month, attended religious service never (52), once (45), 2-3
times (50), four times (43) and more (57). Only the latter group’s average was
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to that of non-attendees. On the other hand, Protestant
(but not Catholic or other religion) subjects seemed to be more able to sustain
cooperation over the rounds of the game compared with non-religious ones.
16In a subsequent study, Anderson et al. (2010) repeated the same exercise with
college students and again none of the variables explained contributions sig-
niﬁcantly. Interestingly, they ﬁnd a negative but insigniﬁcant eﬀect of any
religious aﬃliation compared with none. The coeﬃcients for the denomina-
tions have diﬀerent signs, but none reach signiﬁcance. Three diﬀerent levels
of monthly service attendance are not individually signiﬁcant, but high at-
tendance subjects contribute more than low ones. Overall, the work by these
authors ﬁnds little eﬀect of religious variables on public good contributions, a
game for which a host of other individual diﬀerence eﬀects have been ascer-
tained.
Ahmed (2009) examines public good game (n=3, a=1.5 and r=1) contribu-
tions using a naturally-occurring classiﬁcation of religiosity based on 103 male
subjects studying for priesthood or secular qualiﬁcations in rural India. The
ﬁnding is that the average contributions of religious (66%) and non-religious
(51) students diﬀer signiﬁcantly (p =0 .014). However, this result could be a
function of other factors diﬀerentiating the two groups; multivariate analysis
with suitable controls is not presented. Also, their game’s one-shot nature does
not allow more ﬁne-grained measures of cooperation to be derived.
Ahmed and Salas (2009) use the same game with identical parameters to study
an international subject group of college students who were asked to self-
declare dichotomously to be either religious or not. These authors found that
%-contributions of religious Indian (47), Mexican (63) and Swedish (66) sub-
jects were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to those of their respective non-religious
compatriots (55, 61, 57). In addition, these diﬀerences have diﬀerent direc-
tions between the three countries: non-religious Indians give more than reli-
gious ones, but religious Swedes and Mexicans give relatively more than their
compatriots. However, between countries, contributions are signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent. Again, other demographic variables seem to have stronger eﬀects than
religious belonging.
In another study with the PGG (Benjamin et al., 2010), college subjects of
diﬀerent (Protestant, Catholic and Jewish) and no religious aﬃliations were
primed using sentence-unscrambling tasks (see section 3.3) to make religion
salient for them. The authors then estimate separate regressions for each of
the four groups to examine whether the priming inﬂuences cooperation. The
relative size of constants in the four models suggests that Catholics give most
and non-religious people least, but the authors report no uni- or multivariate
tests between the contributions of diﬀerent faith groups. Instead, the regres-
sions show that the religious priming intervention had a positive eﬀect on
contributions in the models for Protestant subjects and those of no religion,
it was negative in the Catholic and not signiﬁcant for the Jewish subjects
models respectively. The authors interpret the priming to make the relevant
norms, in this case one’s religion, salient, which thereby brings out its eﬀect on
17behaviour. As a result, they conclude that Catholicism has a negative eﬀect
on cooperation, and Protestantism a positive one. However this interpreta-
tion is not consistent with the larger size of the constant in the regression
for Catholic subjects and has to be treated with caution. Using the data for
direct comparisons across the religious groups might help shed more light on
this issue.
3.1.3 Prisoner’s Dilemma
Chuah et al. (2011) used the well-known prisoner’s dilemma for their study
of religion and cooperation. In this game, each player decides between a co-
operative and a non-cooperative act, the latter of which is strictly dominant.
The resulting dominant-strategy equilibrium is however Pareto-dominated by
mutual cooperation. The game is a 2 × 2v e r s i o no ft h em o r eg e n e r a lp u b l i c
good game. Subject behaviour in experiments in the game usually resembles
what is observed in the public good game, with some cooperation declining
over rounds of the game.
The authors studied both religious groups and values and their joint eﬀect.
In each of the eight experimental sessions, twelve subjects from diﬀerent reli-
gious groups in Malaysia (Buddhist, Christian, Muslim and Hindu) played ten
rounds of the game against every other subject. In one condition, the religion
and ethnicity (Chinese, Indian or Malay) of the other player was revealed,
in another, concealed. The ﬁnding is that compared to the no-information
condition, knowledge of the co-player’s diﬀerent ethnicity and religion has no
eﬀect on the level of cooperation in the game. However, cooperation is sig-
niﬁcantly higher when religious aﬃliation of the co-player is known to be the
same, and higher still when both religion and ethnicity are the same. In addi-
tion, the authors measure subjects’ religiosity using a multi-dimensional scale
(Rohrbaugh and Jessor, 1975) as well as an instrument for fundamentalist
religious beliefs (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992). While subjects’ religious
values had no independent eﬀect of cooperation, fundamentalism especially
served to enhance the positive eﬀect of religious similarity on cooperation.
This study therefore permits a comparison of the eﬀects of both religious val-
ues and religious groups. The results suggest not only that group eﬀects are
larger, but that values only inﬂuence behaviour indirectly through enhancing
group eﬀects further.
3.2 Trust
Trust has been found to be an important explanator in general macro-economic
studies as it lubricates economic interactions and so reduces the cost of trans-
acting (e.g. Fukuyama, 1995; Glaeser et al., 2000). In experimental economics,
diﬀerent facets of trust behaviour are commonly measured using the trust
game (TG), a type of sequential prisoner’s dilemma ﬁrst presented by Kreps
18(1990) and ﬁrst used in an experiment by Berg et al. (1995). It is a two-player
sequential game where a sender chooses any part of a stake of money to send
to a responder. Whatever is sent gets doubled or tripled before the respon-
der decides how much of it to return to the proposer. The sender’s payoﬀ is
whatever was sent plus what is received back; the responder gets whatever
was not returned to the sender. In theory, a rational self-interested responder
would return nothing. In anticipation, a sender would send nothing in the ﬁrst
place. In contrast, eﬃcient outcomes entail the sender sending the entire stake
and can be attributed to sender ‘trustingness’ and responder ‘trustworthiness’
respectively, i.e. the fulﬁlled expectation by the sender that the responder will
return more than the amount sent. The average amount sent in TG exper-
iments is typically about half of the stake. Responders tend to return the
absolute amount sent to them. A large general literature in experimental eco-
nomics has established a number of factors that aﬀect trust in sending and
responding, including attitudes to risk, demographics (culture, gender and
age) as well as structural variables in the experiment such as anonymity (see
Camerer, 2003a, pp. 86 for an overview).
A number of such general studies have included religious denominations among
diﬀerent explanators of trust behaviour. Fehr et al. (2002) ﬁnd that in among
429 German household survey respondents contacted to participate in a TG
experiment, Catholic religion raised sending levels signiﬁcantly in a regres-
sion model with a baseline of religiously unaﬃliated subjects. No eﬀects were
found for Protestant religion on senders or for any denomination on respon-
der behaviour. No eﬀect on trust behaviour was found for church attendance
(≥ once a month). Other variables, such as age and education, were however
signiﬁcant. In a similar study, Bellemare and Kr¨ oger (2007) found that reli-
gious aﬃliation (Catholic, Protestant or none) does not explain either sending
or response behaviour of 499 Dutch subjects while certain age, gender and
education variables do. The impression from these studies is low explanatory
power of religious variables, especially when compared to demographics.
The previously-mentioned study by Karlan (2005) with rural Peruvian micro-
ﬁnance recipients also included a TG played after completion of the public
good task. Senders and responders decided face-to-face but without commu-
nication. Any of a stake of three coins sent by the senders were matched by
the experimenter, and any amount received could be returned. The religious
characteristics of subjects in both roles, i.e. whether and how recently they
attended church, had no eﬀect on their behaviour. However, the characteris-
tics of the other person did: responders who do not attend church at all, and
senders who did not attend recently were sent more by their co-players. These
latter two results are not intuitive and no explanation is oﬀered.
Johansson-Stenman et al. (2008) conducted TGs with Bangladeshi Muslim
and Hindu subjects of the same Bengali ethnic origin. Their subjects were told
19the religious aﬃliation of (absent) co-players which was varied systematically,
including Muslim-Muslim, Muslim-Hindu, Hindu-Muslim and Hindu-Hindu
sender-responder pairs. Surprisingly, there were no diﬀerences in sending or
responses between these four experimental conditions to demonstrate either
ingroup favouritism or outgroup discrimination, which has been found in a
number of cross-cultural experiments where ethnicity rather than religion was
the group identiﬁer (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Burns, 2006; Chuah et al.,
2007).
Tan and Vogel (2008) look at the eﬀect of religiosity rather than religious
aﬃliation on trust behaviour using the multi-dimensional survey instrument
by DeJong et al. (1976). They ﬁnd that senders’ religiosity as an indepen-
dent variable fails to predict their behaviour in any of the models presented.
However, more subtle eﬀects exist. In contrast to the result by Karlan (2005),
senders send more the greater the religiosity of responders which they were
told. This relationship holds overall and for high-religiosity senders, but not
for those with lower religiosity. This latter fact speaks against statistical dis-
crimination, i.e. a belief in greater trustworthiness of religious responders. A
tempting alternative explanation would be that religiosity plays the role of
ag r o u pi d e n t i ﬁ e ra n dg e n e r a t e si n g r o u pf a v o u r i t i s m .T h i si sr e j e c t e dt ot h e
extent that diﬀerences between religiosity of sender and responder do not pre-
dict measures of the extra amount senders send when responders are more
religious. In addition, subjects were not told their own religiosity according
to the survey responses they gave. Responder behaviour was signiﬁcantly and
positively inﬂuenced by their own overall religiosity, and in particular with a
religiosity dimension related to agreement with a number of Christian doc-
trines. Interestingly, while responders who receive more do return more, this
eﬀect is stronger with more religious senders. Overall, the explanatory power
or religiosity in the various models presented in terms of R2 is modest, between
0a n d6 % .
As part of their study mentioned previously, Anderson et al. (2010) report
the eﬀects of religious aﬃliation (none or diﬀerent speciﬁc denominations)
of college students on their behaviour as TG sender and responders. Neither
religious aﬃliation nor church attendance levels aﬀected behaviour in the game
signiﬁcantly.
A task related to the TG is the gift exchange. In it, a ‘manager’ moves ﬁrst and
decides a wage to pay an ‘employee’, who, in response, chooses a hypothetical
work eﬀort level. In this game, manager payoﬀsr i s ei ne m p l o y e ee ﬀort and
fall in wage level; the opposite is true for the employee. Since employees have
no incentive to invest any eﬀort as the wage is already set, managers should
not have an incentive to set a wage above the minimum. In experiments,
both wages and eﬀort level are observed to be larger than these equilibrium
values and are seen to reﬂect reciprocity norms. In the aforementioned study
20by Benjamin et al. (2010), religious priming had little impact on the wages or
eﬀort levels of subjects from diﬀerent aﬃliations. While for all groups, priming
is positively related to both wages and eﬀort, the relationship is negative for
subjects of no religion. However, none of these eﬀects are signiﬁcant with the
exception that Jewish subjects in the employee role expend more eﬀort after
priming.
3.3 Altruism and fairness
Pure altruism involves unconditional positive concerns for others’ payoﬀs,
while fairness involves reciprocation of their kindness and unkindness (Ra-
bin, 1993). These kinds of social preference are increasingly ﬁnding their way
into economic analysis (Camerer, 1997) and can be examined experimentally
using the dictator (DG) and ultimatum (UG) games respectively. In the UG,
a proposer chooses to divide a ﬁxed stake with a responder, who subsequently
decides whether to accept the division (the shares are paid out) or reject
it (neither receives anything). As a rational, self-regarding responder would
never reject any division, the proposer should keep the maximum. In typical
experiments with the game, proposers tend to oﬀer 40-50%, and responders
reject shares less than about 20%. The rejection of unfair oﬀers is thought to
reﬂect inequity aversion. Proposer oﬀers reﬂect anticipation of this as well as
altruistic motives. The DG diﬀers from the UG only in that the responder has
no decision to accept or reject; in that sense it isolates pure altruism by the
proposer by eliminating any motivation to strategically anticipate a respon-
der’s fairness concerns (Forsythe et al., 1994). While self-regarding dictators
should give nothing, experimental ones tend to give in the region of 20-30%.
Eckel and Grossman (2004) study a DG where 167 U.S. college students were
asked to split an endowment of cash between themselves and a non-religious
charity they chose from a list under twelve diﬀerent donation conditions, relat-
ing to the size of the endowment as well as rebates and matching funds given by
the experimenters. Subjects were classiﬁed as either religious or non-religious
according to whether they reported to attend religious services regularly. While
the average donations made by the religious subgroup were somewhat larger
than those of the non-religious one, in ten out of the twelve task conditions,
none of these diﬀerences were statistically signiﬁcant.
Tan (2006) performed both the UG and DG with 47 German college students.
Subjects’ religiosity was measured using 17 of the questions in the multi-
dimensional instrument of DeJong et al. (1976). In regression models using
one-tail signiﬁcance, the ﬁnding is that overall religiosity across all items is
unrelated to both UG proposer and responder behaviour as well as DG oﬀers.
Tan (2006) then performed a factor analysis of the religiosity questionnaire
responses which yielded ﬁve internally consistent factors of individual religios-
ity. When these factors are added to the regression model to replace overall
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them are signiﬁcant explanators of responders’ declared minimum acceptable
oﬀers (two negative, one positive), and the other two signiﬁcantly explain DG
oﬀers (one negative, one positive).
The result that individual, internally reliable dimensions of religiosity are re-
lated to behaviour in opposite ways is striking and suggests a potential ex-
planation for the lack of overall eﬀects of religiosity on diﬀerent kinds of be-
haviour found in most studies: perhaps the countervailing eﬀects of individual
dimensions of religiosity cancel each other out. On the other hand, the ﬁve
religiosity factors obtained by Tan (2006) diﬀer from the theoretical dimen-
sions in DeJong et al. (1976) and are not easy to interpret as each contains an
unintuitive mix of belief, participation and experiential dimensions of religion.
Nonetheless, these provide a promising starting point. Further work is clearly
warranted to unpack the overall eﬀect of religiosity and uncover more about
the sub-eﬀects of its individual dimensions on diﬀerent types of economic be-
haviour.
After performing the PGG discussed above, the student subjects of Ahmed
(2009) played a DG using their PGG winnings as the stake and ﬁctitious re-
ceivers.10 The students enrolled on religious courses gave a signiﬁcantly larger
proportion (22%) of their previous winnings than non-religious (13) students.
It should be noted that these DG-donations may have been aﬀected by sub-
jects’ PGG experience and size of winnings. Also, the study does not control
for potentially other diﬀering aspects between the religious and non-religious
subjects which may explain the ﬁnding.
Shariﬀ and Norenzayan (2007) address the issue that associations between re-
ligious variables and pro-social behaviour may reﬂect correlations rather than
causation, i.e. merely capture the eﬀect of other causal variables underlying
both, such as feelings of guilt or empathy. As a result, they designed a DG-
experiment where subjects were religiously primed, i.e. concepts of the divine
were activated in them using a sentence task where the correct unscrambling
of word sequences reveals certain religious concepts. In the control condition,
subjects self-declared to be religious gave slightly more than others, but this
diﬀerence was not statistically signiﬁcant. However, the religious prime raised
average donations across both groups markedly from 18.4% to 42.2%. This
eﬀect was signiﬁcant both in religious and non-religious subjects. The same
results held for 75 city residents, with the exception that the overall signif-
icant eﬀect of the religious prime (raising giving from 25.6 to 45.6%) was
present in religious subjects but insigniﬁcant for non-religious ones who, for
this second group, were deﬁned in a stricter way. An additional secular-moral
prime caused similar eﬀects to the religious one (raising giving from 25.6 to
44.4%), but the authors do not test for a diﬀerence in eﬀect between the two
primes. This latter ﬁnding leaves open the possibility that priming or framing
22eﬀects of a general and not speciﬁcally religious nature are responsible for the
impressive rises in altruism.
In contrast to these results, Benjamin et al. (2010) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects of
religious priming on DG-giving for subjects of diﬀerent or no religious denom-
inations. The coeﬃcients of the dummy variable for the priming condition for
Protestants and Catholic are negative. For Jewish subjects, there was an in-
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect. The priming only aﬀected no-religion subjects, who
gave signiﬁcantly less as a result (at p<0.1). Benjamin et al. (2010) also pool
their data with those of Shariﬀ and Norenzayan (2007) and ﬁnd no eﬀect of
priming overall.
Malhotra (2010) examines bidding behaviour in a ﬁeld experiment involving
online auctions where proceeds go to charity. After being outbid, subjects
received onscreen message appeals to continue bidding. Subjects were clas-
siﬁed according to their declared religious attendance as either non-religious
(attends never, rarely, occasionally) or religious (regularly). The ﬁnding of lo-
gistic regressions is that type of appeal (either to subjects’ religious motives
or competitiveness), subjects’ religiosity and the auction’s day of the week
did not inﬂuence appeal eﬀectiveness. However, looking at Sunday auctions
only, he ﬁnds that re-bidding probability is signiﬁcantly higher in religious
(40%) compared with non-religious (12%) subjects. On other days, re-bidding
was similar for both groups (around 26%). The interpretation is that Sunday
served as a prime that activated religious norms in religious subjects. What
causes the opposite eﬀect in non-religious subjects is not clear.
Chuah and Hibbert (2011) also conducted a ﬁeld experiment on the eﬀect of
persuasive messages on online charitable giving, in their case DG-donations
to a international aid charity by 91 UK college and non-college subjects over
ﬁve days. Three conditions were created by framing the appeal message either
neutrally, positively or negatively through uplifting or guilt-inducing photos
of ostensible recipients. Religiosity was measured using the dimensional scale
of Rohrbaugh and Jessor (1975) and a dichotomous classiﬁcation as either
belonging to a religion or not. Overall religiosity did not explain donations in
any of the conditions. When religiosity is broken down into the four individual
dimensions of the measure, only in the neutral condition, consequential religion
reduces donations at the 95% level of signiﬁcance. In addition, there were no
diﬀerences in giving between subjects based on belonging to a religion in any
of the three conditions. However, those belonging to a religion were inﬂuenced
by either kind of appeal, whereas non-religious subjects were not.
As we have seen, psychologists have found in surveys that religiosity is as-
sociated with attitudinal and value dimensions such as right-wing political
orientation, prejudice and ethnocentrism. In China, the demise of Communist
doctrine is creating an ideological vacuum that is ﬁlled by both religion and
23nationalist sentiments. This presents an opportunity how these two types of
values evolve and are relate to each other. Hoﬀmann and Larner (2011) report
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their religiosity was associated with ethnocentric behaviour. In the experi-
mental task, subjects were asked to split a 10 Renminbi donation made on
their behalf between a Chinese educational and International medical charity.
The percentage of the endowment subjects invested in the home charity was
unrelated to their overall religiosity or any of the individual dimensions.
3.4 Parametric choice
The studies discussed so far considered social decision making where subjects’
decisions aﬀected the payoﬀs of others (altruism), and, in the case of strategic
social situations, also vice versa (cooperation and trust). In contrast, paramet-
ric decisions do not involve others. Economically relevant dimensions studied
in the general experimental literature on parametric choice include individual
preferences for risk and time. Religious doctrines tend to espouse thrift and
a long-term orientation and oppose gambling and other risky activities. How-
ever, the link of parametric behaviours to religiosity are much less intuitive
than those for social ones. The study by Benjamin et al. (2010) includes three
tasks to test for the eﬀects of religion on parametric behaviour.
First, similar to the standard task introduced by Holt and Laury (2002), Ben-
jamin et al. studied the risk attitudes of subjects in terms of a series of binary
choices between a sure thing and a chance of increasingly large prizes. The
authors assess, within each of the religious aﬃliations in their sample, whether
their religious priming treatment (discussed previously) aﬀects subjects’ risk
taking. Interestingly, priming causes increases in risky behaviour for all but
Jewish subjects. These eﬀects are signiﬁcant only for non-religious subjects at
95% and for Catholics at 90%.
Second, Benjamin et al. studied time preference, i.e. subjects’ trade-oﬀsb e -
tween a certain amount now and a large one at a certain point in the fu-
ture. Subjects faced 24 such choices with diﬀering time intervals and delayed
amounts. In their regressions again testing for the eﬀect of religious prim-
ing within each of the religious aﬃliations, the coeﬃcients for the treatment
dummy variable were positive (suggesting greater now-orientation) but in-
signiﬁcant for every one of the four religious aﬃliations.
Finally, Benjamin et al. examine subjects’ work eﬀort levels using a laboratory
piecework task. It is motivated by Weber’s hypothesis of a Protestant work
ethic. The authors measured how many anagrams subjects solved in a ﬁve
minute period in return for a ﬁxed reward for each. Again, there seem to be
(untested) diﬀerences in eﬀort between religious aﬃliations, but there were
no eﬀects of religious priming on eﬀort within each of these. Interestingly,
24the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients are positive for all groups expect Protestants,
who, contrary to Weber’s hypothesis, seem to invest less eﬀort under priming.
However, there were no reported controls for subject solving ability, disposable
income or opportunity cost which may have confounded results.
In summary, Benjamin et al. (2010) found little variation in these parametric
behaviours between religious aﬃliations. While comparison between the non-
religious group of atheists and agnostics provides some insight into the eﬀect
of religiosity here, relating a continuous religiosity measure to parametric de-
cisions would provide a ﬁner-grained measure. In addition, any diﬀerential
eﬀects for religious aﬃliations as examined in this study may be particularly
susceptible to inadvertently capturing correlated, non-religious eﬀects. As an
example, an eﬀect found for Jewish subjects compared to non-religious ones
may reﬂect general aspects of Jewish culture rather than of religion. Analyses
controlling for individual religiosity could account for this type of confound.
4 Discussion
Religion continues to be one of the most important and visible institutions
in human society which captures public imagination and discourse like few
others. It is associated with clear hypothetical links to individual behaviour
in secular settings that make it relevant to social science. This is true espe-
cially for the types of pro-social behaviour experimental economists commonly
study, such as cooperation, trust and altruism, which are at the heart of most
religion’s doctrines. However, the application of experimental economics to re-
ligion has so far shown that such relationships are at best weak and, if found
in one study, lack robustness in terms of replicability. In surveying the studies,
one is struck by the paucity of signiﬁcant eﬀects and their small size reported
across the literature. The eﬀects of other variables, such as gender, age or other
demographics, are mostly stronger when assessed alongside religious variables.
Perhaps we should not be surprised at this state of aﬀairs: ﬁrst, similar results
of religious consequences were found in the psychological approach outlined
in section 2.3. In addition, conditions of incentive compatibility which experi-
mental economics brings to the analyses is meant to reduce the very response
biases which tend to operate towards an expression of pro-social religious con-
sequences. Finally, to the extent that religiosity and religious participation
are universal human experiences, perhaps we should not expect to ﬁnd these
variables powerful in explaining diﬀerential behaviour patterns (cf. Argyle and
Beit-Hallahmi, 1975, p. 80).
These thoughts notwithstanding, experimental economics has developed reli-
able methods that have shed much insight into other areas of social life, and
to this extent one ought to have conﬁdence it what has (not) been found. It
remains for us to conclude. In this ﬁnal section, I ﬁrst provide a schematic
overview of the variables examined in the course of the psychology and the
25experimental economics of religion discussed in previous sections. I then sum-
marise the overall picture that emerges and comment on possible explanations
for the lack of religious consequences. Finally, I conclude regarding the role of
religion in social behaviour as well as the contribution experimental economics
has made here.
4.1 Variables in the social scientiﬁc study of religion
Figure 2 provides an overview of the diﬀerent variables studied in scientiﬁc
approaches to religion discussed in this article. The approaches examine (a)
the antecedents and eﬀects of individual religion in (b) both religious and
secular domains (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975, p. 1). These two dimen-
sions are captured by the two axes in the chart. The horizontal axis measures
the location in the causal chain between antecedent cause, individual religion
or its behavioural eﬀects. Some factors examined by researchers are clearly
causes and not eﬀects of religion (such as parental religion and gender). Oth-
ers, such as speciﬁc decisions observed in economic games, are eﬀects rather
than causes. However, some variables are a mixture, and exist in mutually-
reinforcing relationships with religion. For example, certain prior values may
attract people to religion, but clearly religious membership has the potential of
shaping these further. As we go from left to right in the chart, antecedent fac-
tors inﬂuence a person’s religion, which in turn shapes behaviour. The second
dimension, on the vertical axis, relates to the religion-speciﬁc versus general
(secular) nature of the factors of interest to the social scientist. While some be-
havioural variables, such as prayer activity and church attendance are clearly
religious, others are secular, such as the decisions studied in experimental
economics. Other behaviour, such as charitable donations, fall somewhere in
the middle in being secularly situated, but subject to religious precepts. The
same distinction can be made for antecedent factors: people may be prone
to become religious due to general, inheritable traits or speciﬁcally religious
environmental factors such as parental socialisation. In the chart, those vari-
ables commonly studied in the experimental economics approach to religion
are shaded.11
4.2 The lack of religious consequences
Across the ﬁve areas of social and parametric behaviour, using the various
measures of individual religion, few signiﬁcant eﬀects of religious values or
groups have been found. Parametric decisions were examined in one study
only, which found no signiﬁcant relationships. For cooperation, only Ahmed
(2009) ﬁnds greater contributions of religious subjects. The result however is
blunt both in terms of the one-shot nature of the task and of dichotomously-
measured religiosity; in addition, one might be worried by the lack of control
for other factors. Other studies have not been able to replicate it. Chuah et al.
(2011) ﬁnd only an indirect eﬀect of religiosity via religious groups. For trust,
26Fig. 2. Variables examined in the social scientiﬁc study of religion. The horizontal
dimension shows variables as aspects of individual religion or its antecedents and
eﬀects. The vertical axis displays them as speciﬁcally religious or general secular
factors. Gray boxes indicate variables used in the experimental economics of religion.
religious aﬃliation or non-aﬃliation also produced no robust eﬀects across a
series of studies. The only eﬀect of religiosity on trust behaviour involves not a
subject’s own but only the co-player’s religiosity (Tan and Vogel, 2008), raising
the possibility of religiosity acting as a group identiﬁer rather than in its own
right. However, surprisingly, the same lack of results is true for one study
(Johansson-Stenman et al., 2008) that directly measured religious ingroup-
outgroup eﬀects. These are generally easy to observe in other settings, using
both naturally-occurring or manufactured group identiﬁers. For altruism, the
study by Ahmed (2009) is again alone in ﬁnding higher levels of pro-sociality
in religious subjects. Other studies involving diﬀerent measures of religion
and religious priming treatments do not suggest robust eﬀects on altruism.
Tan (2006) oﬀers a potential explanation here by detecting opposite eﬀects of
27diﬀerent dimensions of religiosity.
This latter ﬁnding points to one potential explanations for the dearth of sig-
niﬁcant results. Countervailing positive and negative eﬀects of religiosity may
operate between or within individuals. Between subjects, extrinsically and in-
trinsically religious people may diﬀer in their pro-sociality. Alternatively, the
greater pro-sociality of moderate religionists may be oﬀset by the opposite
tendency in fundamentalist ones (e.g. Allport, 1954). For instance, there may
be a generally curvilinear relationship such that greater pro-sociality lies in
individuals of overall medium religiosity (e.g. Argyle, 2000, p. 193). More so-
phisticated empirical modelling and analyses (Greenwald, 1975, p. 583) are
needed in this area, especially to the extent that the relationships between
religious variables and behaviour are indeed non-linear. Within subjects, very
religious people may be torn in facing cognitive dissonance between the pur-
ported only truth of their faith and tolerance towards non-adherents. Practices
such as confession, divine forgiveness and absolution may lessen the pro-social
consequences in some religious individuals. We have seen also how the os-
tensible eﬀects of religious values may really reﬂect the inﬂuence of other
correlated, antecedent variables such as certain individual diﬀerence or de-
mographic traits associated with religious people. It is possible that some of
these may work in opposite directions, for example, prejudice and feelings of
guilt. In this sense, researchers may be picking up the countervailing eﬀects of
the diﬀerent underlying variables though religion, rather than its independent
eﬀect.
4.3 Religious values and religious groups
Countervailing eﬀects of individual religion may also lie in a tension between
its two facets, i.e. religious values and religious groups. It may be that while
internalised religious precepts favour pro-social behaviour, religious aﬃliation
leads to outgroup discrimination towards those outside one’s own faith group.
Overall, religious group eﬀects seem somewhat more robust in having been
found in a number of studies (Ruﬄe and Sosis, 2006; Tan and Vogel, 2008;
Chuah et al., 2011). From the experimental economics perspective, the avail-
able evidence leads to the opposite conclusion to McCleary and Barro (2006, p.
68), who, at the macro-level, attributed a relatively greater eﬀect to religious
values. Our present conclusion chimes with the view of Stark who argues, from
and for the sociological perspective, that
there are robust religious eﬀects to be found if we cease being de facto
psychologists and [...] stop treating religion only as an individual trait,
and seek its collective eﬀects (Stark, 1984, p. 281).
If so, it should be noted that religious group eﬀects intrinsically have po-
tentially little to do with the substance of religion. The well-known minimal
group paradigm attests that even ‘empty’ or artiﬁcially-created social groups
28are powerful in inﬂuencing behaviour. Religion then has importance to social
scientists mainly as one of many alternative such social group identiﬁers.
It is generally not well understood which among multiple group identiﬁers is
invoked in a given situation (Fiske and Taylor, 1991, p.142). The use of religion
as a group identiﬁer over alternative possible social categories may depend on
the extent to which an individual subscribes to it, i.e. on religiosity (Chuah
et al., 2011). This study suggests that the eﬀects of religious values, when they
exist, seem to be mainly connected to its role as enhancing identiﬁcation with
the religious groups or willingness to act out intergroup behaviours such as
ingroup favouritism or outgroup discrimination: religious people may express
their pro-social values preferentially towards fellow adherents. Conversely, reli-
gious values may transmit stereotypes and prejudice against members of other
religious groups (Allport, 1954).
In conclusion, while religion is undoubtedly important for individual devel-
opment, culture, political and social discourse, it does not exert a powerful
inﬂuence on individuals’ interactions with others other than functioning as
one of alternative social group identiﬁers. Substantively, it seems that reli-
gious values have little impact on individual social behaviour. Experimental
economics has made an important contribution to securing these kinds of con-
clusion and to the scientiﬁc study of religion generally. Experimental control
and incentive compatibility especially are features that are well-suited in this
context and successfully addressed some of the issues surrounding response bi-
ases and confounding factors. While some results have been conﬁrmed, some
new insights have emerged from this approach. In particular, the possible in-
teraction between religious values and groups seems important for a deeper
understanding of the social consequences of religion.
There is also much unﬁnished business here. Recent work in experimental eco-
nomics has explored anti-social preferences and behaviour such as deception
and spite (e.g. Gneezy, 2005; Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009). The experimental
tools developed in these and other studies promise opportunities to better ex-
amine the relationship between religiosity and opportunism discussed earlier.
Finally, the game theoretic models frequently used as platforms by experi-
mental economists are well-suited to observe strategic behaviour patterns in
given interactions. They can be used to examine to what extent religiosity is
associated with religious precepts such as forgiveness, turning the other cheek
or an-eye-for-an-eye.
Notes
1These ﬁgures are 2009 PPP GDP per capita ﬁgures in current international $.
Source: World Bank. Religion data are from the CIA World Factbook.
292For a counter-demonstration see Brams’s (2006) game-theoretic analysis of re-
ligious and existential choices
3Note though that broad participation in religion and widespread high religiosity
points to group-level explanators (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975, p. 80). This issue
will be revisited in section 4.
4Scobie (1975) shares this pessimism in that ”it is extremely diﬃcult [...] to use
laboratory methods to investigate religious behaviour, as this sort of behaviour is
dependent on its environmental setting” (p. 35). The latter part of his statement is
clearly true but misses the point of experiments somewhat, which is to control these
confounding inﬂuences to disentangle their individual impacts from each other.
5Over the past half century or so, experimental economics has developed an inde-
pendent method based on experimental psychology but with distinguishing features
designed for the kinds of problems economists are interested in. For overviews of
the experimental method as used in economics, its uses, advantages and drawbacks,
see Roth (1995, p. 22), Croson (2005).
6Depending on purpose, there are alternative ways of grouping the factors diﬀer-
ent experiments examine. Camerer (2003b, p.56-59) distinguishes between method-
ological, structural, demographic, cultural, descriptive and structural variables, while
Ledyard (1995, p.143) has three categories: environment, systemic and design vari-
ables. Any categorisation can only serve conceptual purposes as it is impossible to
draw deﬁnitive lines between them.
7For further background to these games and an overview of studies within the
general literature for comparison with the results that follow, see Camerer (2003a).
8Bradley Ruﬄe, personal communication.
9In Sosis and Ruﬄe (2003), the coeﬃcient for the dummy representing secular
females is erroneously reported as insigniﬁcant in table 4. Bradley Ruﬄe, personal
communication.
10Subjects were told donations would go to people who had not received anything,
but were actually given to charity.
11The various observed relationships between individual variables discussed in
this paper can be depicted in the chart; arrows indicating them have been omitted
to avoid cluttering.
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